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ABSTRACT: Disruptive innovations are innovations that have the capacity to transform a 
whole business into one with products that are more accessible and affordable (cf. 
Christensen et al. 2009). As Christensen et al. argue no business is immune to such disruptive 
innovations. If these authors are right, it might be relevant to be able to recognize these 
innovations before they disrupt a business. Incumbents may use this information to protect 
their business and others may use it to participate in the disruption. Either way, gathering 
information about potential disruptive innovations is a relevant activity. The production of 
this information (we call this information “disruptive Intelligence”) is the topic of this paper. 
In particular, we analyze disruptive innovation theory and formulate several intelligence 
topics which may help in predicting disruptive innovations. In addition, we formulate several 
‘biases’ which may impair the production of ‘disruptive intelligence’.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Disruptive innovations are innovations that have the 
capacity to transform a whole business into one 
with products that are more affordable, convenient 
and accessible (cf. Christensen et al. 2009). The 
idea of “disruptive innovation” (and its related 
theory) was developed by Christensen and 
colleagues (e.g. Christensen, 1997, Christensen and 
Raynor (2003), Christensen (2006), Christensen, 
Grossman and Hwang (2009) Christensen and 
Eyring, (2011)) and has attracted attention by 
scholars and practitioners alike. A disruptive 
innovation, as Christensen defines it, is initially a 
new product or service with inferior performance 
on the attributes most appreciated by mainstream 
customers of the old product or service and, hence, 
it doesn’t appeal to these customers. It does, 
however, attract the less demanding, more price 
sensitive customers of the old product and/or 
customers who value the innovation’s other 
performance attributes. In time, the innovation 
improves in such a way that it also appeals to 
mainstream customers of the old product (cf. 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 
2009, Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006b or Schmidt 
and Druehl, 2008 for a similar description of 
disruptive innovations).  
As pointed out by Christensen (Christensen 
1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003 or Christensen 
et al., 2009)  “[…]incumbent firms often fail to 
recognize the threat posed by a disruptive 
innovation.” (Schmidt and Druehl, 2008). As 
disruptive innovations target “less profitable 
customers in less attractive tiers of the markets” 
(Christensen et al. 2002, p. 23) or even non-
consumers of the old product, incumbents lack the 
motivation to compete. The effect is often that 
incumbents, when the disruptive innovation has 
evolved into a product that appeals to their 
mainstream customers, are too late to react and may 
even lose the competitive struggle. In such a case a 
disruption of the business has occurred.  
Christensen and his colleagues give many 
examples of disruptive innovations that had a 
dramatic impact on incumbents. For instance, in the 
1950s Sony’s portable transistor radio disrupted the 
then existing radio-business; in the 1970s the 
mainframe business was disrupted by the invention 
of the micro-processor enabling the production of 
PC’s; Amazon.com has (to some degree) disrupted 
the traditional bookstores and eBay disrupted (to 
some extent) the traditional auction-business 
(examples taken from Christensen et al. 2003, who 
provide an extensive list of disruptive companies – 
e.g. pp. 56-65). As Christensen et al. (2009) argue, 
no business is immune to disruptive innovations. If 
this is true, then, of course, it is of utmost relevance 
to be able to recognize these innovations before 
they start to disrupt a business. This is true for 
incumbents who may want to prevent their demise 
and for those who want to launch or participate in 
disruptive innovations. Either way, gathering 
information about actual or potential disruptive 
innovations is a highly relevant activity – a notion 
that has been put forward by other authors as well 
(e.g. Christensen et al., 2002; Adner, 2002; Paap 
and Katz, 2004, Danneels, 2006; Schmidt and 
Druehl, 2008). We call this information “disruptive 
Intelligence” and the main question for this paper is 
how to produce such intelligence. 
To understand the production of disruptive 
intelligence, it is necessary to understand the nature 
of disruptive innovations. That is, we need to 
understand what a disruptive innovation is (which 
is a difficult task in itself, as Danneels (2006) points 
out) and, as Adner, 2002, noted, we need “… an 
understanding of the conditions that give rise to 
disruptive technologies […]” (p. 667). Based on 
“disruptive innovation theory” as developed over 
the past decades we can gain such understanding 
and use it to guide the production of disruptive 
intelligence.  
It should be noted that gaining insight into 
information needed to deal with disruptive 
innovations is a topic that has already been 
addressed by several authors (e.g., Paap and Katz, 
2004; Christensen et al., 2002, Christensen et al., 
2003). However, since these attempts, disruptive 
innovation theory has matured (cf. Christensen 
2006 about the development of the theory, and 
Christensen et al., 2009 for an updated version). In 
newer versions the understanding of the relevant 
characteristics of disruptive innovations and their 
drivers has evolved. Based on this improved 
understanding we are able to give an updated 
version of the required “disruptive intelligence”.  
The main question of our paper is important, not 
only because of its relevance for strategy 
formulation (fighting or engaging in disruption), 
but also because a systematic, up-to-date attempt at 
answering it seems to be lacking in the existing 
literature.  
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To deal with the question of producing 
disruptive intelligence, this paper is organized as 
follows. First, we summarize disruptive innovation 
theory (section 2). This will present us with a 
description of disruptive innovations and with an 
overview of their drivers. In section 3, we use 
relevant aspects from disruptive intelligence theory 
to discuss three important topics related to the 
production of disruptive intelligence: (1) how do 
we know whether a market is prone for disruption? 
(2) how do we know whether disruption is going 
on?, and (3) how can we prevent blind spots in 
gathering disruptive intelligence?  
 
2. Disruptive innovation theory 
 
To understand how intelligence needed to deal with 
disruptive innovations can be produced, we first 
need to describe disruptive innovations in some 
more detail. In particular, based on an 
understanding of (1) the concept of disruptive 
innovations and (2) their drivers we will be in a 
position to direct intelligence efforts. This section 
discusses disruptive innovations and their drivers 
based on disruptive innovation theory as it has been 
developed over the last twenty years. Section 3 will 
go into disruptive intelligence. 
 
2.1 Disruptive innovations 
 
To explain what disruptive innovations are, 
Christensen often starts with explaining so-called 
sustaining innovations (e.g. Christensen et al., 
2003; Christensen et al., 2009). A sustaining 
innovation is an innovation that improves the 
performance of an existing product or service “[…] 
with success measured along dimensions 
historically valued by their customers” (Christensen 
et al., 2009, p. 4). These innovations set out to 
improve the performance on the attributes valued 
by mainstream customers (cf. Govindarajan and 
Kopalle, 2006b, p. 27). Typical examples are 
innovations leading to faster cars, disk drives with 
better storage capacity, or radio’s and TV’s of 
better quality (cf. Ch 2003; 2009)  
As Christensen explains, a series of sustaining 
innovations typically results in products and 
services that “over-serve” costumers - they lead to a 
performance that most customers can no longer 
utilize (Christensen et al., 2009, p 5). At some 
point, for instance, faster cars don’t really make 
sense given the constraining circumstances for 
using this speed (Christensen et al., 2003, p. 32-33; 
Christensen et al., 2009, p. 4). As the market for 
particular customers can be divided into different 
tiers, Christensen et al., (2003, p. 33) explains that 
the degree of over-serving is different for each tier. 
Typically, the low-end, less demanding and/or price 
sensitive part of the market may be “over-served” 
sooner than the high-end part of the market. The 
reason for the focus on sustaining innovations is 
that incumbents “[…] are striving for better 
products that they can sell for higher profit margins 
to not-yet-satisfied customers in more demanding 
tiers of the market” (Christensen et al., 2003, p. 34).  
In all, “[…] a sustaining innovation targets 
demanding, high-end customers with better 
performance than what was previously available”. 
(p. 34). 
Given this explanation, disruptive innovations 
are contrasted to sustaining innovations. Disruptive 
innovations do not aim to make existing products 
better, rather, they introduce products that actually 
underperform compared to existing products (cf. 
Christensen et al., 2003, p. 34). Yet, “[…] they 
offer other benefits – typically they are simpler, 
more convenient, and less expensive products that 
appeal to new or less-demanding customers” 
(Christensen et al., 2003, p. 34) and not to 
mainstream customers. Some of the examples 
Christensen and his colleagues provide us with are: 
disk drives with less storage capacity but increased 
portability; cheap, portable computing devices with 
less computing power (early “pc’s”), and cheaper 
cars with less functionalities. As Christensen et al., 
2009 argue, these disruptive innovations offer 
“affordability, accessibility and convenience” over 
the performance attributes that are valued by the 
mainstream customers. 
Now, as disruptive products gradually improve 
– due to their own sustaining innovations, they 
eventually appeal to the mainstream customers of 
the old product. (Christensen et al., 2003; 
Christensen et al., 2009). In terms of the examples 
Christensen provides: personal computers improved 
up to the point that they appealed to the users of 
mainframes; transistor radios improved to match 
the quality of the large vacuum tube radios, the 
storage capacity of portable disk drives increased to 
match the performance of their less portable 
predecessors. The improvement of a disruptive 
product may eventually lead to a disruption of the 
business: which starts to occur when mainstream 
customers prefer the new product. 
In his earlier work, Christensen et al. made a 
distinction between “new market disruptions” and 
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“low-end disruptions” (Christensen et al., 2003). A 
low end disruption targets at the low end tiers of the 
market – costumers who are less demanding and 
more price sensitive. These are the customers with a 
high degree of “over-serving” who are quite willing 
to buy a product with less functionalities – they 
would buy less powerful cars; disk drives with less 
storage capacity, PC’s with less processing speed, 
etc. Gradually, the product improves “from the low-
end up” and starts appealing to more demanding 
tiers of the market. A typical feature of low-end 
disruptions is that they “grow by picking off the 
least attractive of the established firms’ customers”. 
(Christensen et al., 2003, p. 46). Christensen 
discusses the example of “so-called steel mini-
mills”, mills that were able to produce steel far 
more efficiently in far smaller settings than the 
established steel mills. At the outset, the new 
technology enabled these mini-mills to produce 
steel of a quality that only appealed to the least 
demanding tier of the market. However, as 
technology improved, mini-mills were able to 
produce steel of a quality that also appealed to the 
more demanding tiers (Christensen et al., 2003 pp. 
35-39).  
A new market disruption introduces products 
that “compete against non-consumption” 
(Christensen et al., 2003, p. 45). That is, they open 
up for a new market of customers who couldn’t 
afford the old product and/or who are attracted by 
the new product’s additional performance 
attributes. The first portable Sony transistor radios 
were of less quality than the existing “table top” 
radios. However, their low cost and portability 
appealed to a new type of customer: teenagers who 
could now listen to music whenever and wherever 
they pleased (cf. Christensen, et al. 2003, p. 104/5). 
In general, Christensen argues, new customers are 
attracted by affordability and or additional 
attributes like accessibility and convenience. In his 
language: the products enabled new customers to 
realize a job they wanted to have done, something 
the old product couldn’t. After a series of sustaining 
innovations, these products improve and start to 
appeal to customers of the old product.  
It should be noted that disruptions can also be 
“hybrids’ (Christensen et al., 2003, p. 47). For 
instance, the introduction of the cheap Toyota 
Corolla (made possible because of Toyota’s 
efficient production-system) is an example of a 
hybrid as it appealed to low-end “over-served” 
price-sensitive customers, while it also attracted 
new customers who previously couldn’t afford a car 
(Christensen et al.,  2003, p. 64).  
An important aspect of Christensen’s work is 
that incumbents fail to react adequately to 
disruptive innovations. When a low-end disruption 
occurs, stealing away their less profitable 
customers, incumbents are often not willing to 
compete. In such a case, they will be motivated to 
focus on the more profitable tiers of the market (cf. 
Christensen et al., 2002, p.23) – a reaction they may 
later regret. When a new-market disruption occurs 
they may have even more trouble to react, as the 
product doesn’t even target their existing 
customers. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006b) list 
several reasons why incumbents have a hard time 
reacting to disruptive innovations. For instance, the 
new product does not appeal to mainstream 
customers because it has a different “package of 
performance attributes at the time of introduction” 
(p. 191), and because it performs less on the 
attributes valued by them; Moreover, the new 
product may be “[…] introduced in an emerging or 
insignificant niche market” and “[…it…] offers a 
lower margin” (p. 191). As a result, a recurrent 
theme in the history of disruptive innovations is that 
incumbents often realize too late that their business 
is being disrupted.  
 
2.2 Drivers of disruptive innovations 
 
After having discussed the idea of disruptive 
innovation, a next question is how these 
innovations are brought about. To answer this 
question Christensen et al. (2009) identify three 
drivers or enablers: a “technological enabler”, a 
suitable “business model” and an adequate “value 
network” (2009, p. xx ff).  
 
2.2.1 Technological enablers 
 
A technological enabler of a disruptive innovation 
refers to “sophisticated technology whose purpose 
it is to simplify, it routinizes the solution to 
problems […] (Christensen et al., 2009, p. xx). 
Technology is taken to be a broad concept, as it 
refers to any “[…] way of combining inputs […] 
into outputs of greater value” (Christensen et al., 
2009, p. 1). And if such a “way of combining 
inputs” is simpler and/or more affordable than the 
existing technology, then it is a potential enabler for 
a disruptive innovation. Defined this way, a 
technological can refer to a technical innovation 
(e.g. the micro-processor – making the task of 
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“computing” simpler and more affordable) or to a 
specific organizational structure and way of 
performing tasks (e.g. the Toyota production 
system – making the production of cars more 
efficient and hence the cars themselves more 
affordable). A technological enabler can be used to 
make products simpler, more convenient or more 
affordable (e.g. the micro-processor enabling the 
production of personal computers which were much 
simpler devices than mainframes) and/or it can 
make the process of production simpler and more 
cost-efficient - and hence, its resulting products 
more affordable (e.g. the Toyota-production system 
made production more cost-efficient, and as it 
happened, the micro-processor also simplified the 
process of design and assembly – Christensen et al., 
2009). As a final remark, it should be noted that 
disruptive technology doesn’t always need to be a 
new technical invention – it can also refer to a new 
use of existing technology (e.g. using the Internet in 
a way that may disrupt a business, like eBay did 
according to Christensen et al., 2009, p. 31).  
 
2.2.2 Business models as enablers of disruptive 
innovations.  
 
In the course of developing disruptive innovation 
theory, business models became more central 
(Christensen, 2006). In later versions of the theory, 
it is argued that disruptive innovations can only 
come about if there is a “supportive” business 
model. A relevant question then becomes: what is a 
business model and how does it enable disruption? 
 
Business models 
 
Christensen identifies a business model as a 
particular arrangement of four components: a value 
proposition, processes, a profit formula and the 
organization’s resources (cf, Stabell & Fjeldstad, 
1998; Christensen et al., 2009, p. 9). 
A value proposition, in essence, refers to the 
value offered to customers. It indicates how a 
product or service may help “[…] customers do 
more effectively, conveniently, and affordably a job 
they have been trying to do” (p. 9). Although each 
firm has its own specific value proposition, 
Christensen discusses three types of value 
propositions (following Thompson (1967) and 
Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998)). He identifies a “value 
adding process” (with its basic value proposition to 
transform inputs into outputs – e.g. retailing, 
restaurants, or car-manufacturers) a “solution shop” 
(with its basic value proposition to solve clients’ 
unstructured problems – e.g. a professional service 
firm) and a “facilitated network” (with its basic 
value proposition to link clients / supply and 
demand – e.g. a bank)1.    
The processes-part of a business model refers to 
the primary process activities and how they are 
related (Stabell and Fjeldstad; 1998) – although 
Christensen et al. define it broader (including the 
primary and secondary “way[s] of working together 
to address recurrent tasks in a consistent way” 
(2009; p. 9, 10). As Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) 
argue, three different types of process-activities and 
relations can be identified (related to the three types 
of value propositions discussed above). If a value 
proposition falls in the class of “value adding 
process”, its primary process activities are typically 
those of Porter’s value chain: inbound logistics, 
operations, outbound logistics, marketing and 
service (Porter, 1985, 39-40). These activities are 
mainly related sequentially and contribute – in 
sequence – to the final product or service. As 
Thompson (1967) explains, these activities and 
their sequential ordering make sense if the process 
is structured; well understood, predictable and/or 
routine to a considerable degree. If a value 
proposition aims at dealing with unstructured 
problems (a solution shop), then the main process 
activities are diagnosis (problem finding), design 
(propose a solution to the problem), implementation 
(of the proposed solution), and evaluation (of the 
implemented solution) (cf. Stabell and Fjeldstad, 
1998, p. 415). Moreover, as these problems are 
unstructured, the activities are mostly carried out in 
a “cyclical or spiraling” way (cf. Stabell and 
Fjeldstad, 1998, p. 415). That is, carrying out 
activities is based on the feedback received during 
or after the execution of activities, and based on 
that feedback it may be necessary to redo those 
activities (cf. Thompson’s (1967) description of 
intensive technology). If the value proposition is to 
link clients (facilitated network), the main primary 
activities are network promotion, service 
provisioning and infrastructure operation (Stabell 
and Fjeldstad, 1998, p. 415). Moreover, as the 
authors point out, these activities can be carried out 
in parallel. So, each of the three types of value 
                                                          
1
 Even though the basic distinctions derive from 
Thompson ‘s technology typology identifying long 
linked, intensive and mediating technology, we will 
refer to the three labels used by Christensen et al. 
(2009, p. 20 ff). 
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proposition is related to its own set of process-
activities.  
A profit formula refers (1) to the profit and cost 
drivers, and (2) to the way customers pay for 
products and services. With respect to the first 
aspect of the profit formula, Christensen et al. 
write: that it “[…] defines the required price, 
markups, gross and net profit margins, asset turn, 
and volumes necessary to cover profitably the costs 
[…]” (2009, p. 9). It refers, for instance, to the 
choice to make products in large volumes with low 
margins or in small volumes with a high margin. 
Christensen further specifies the way customers pay 
for products and services into three classes: fixed 
price, fee-for-service and membership fee. Again, 
dependent on the type of value proposition, a 
particular profit formula is more or less suitable. As 
a value adding process relates to predictable routine 
processes, its key profit drivers are (economies of) 
scale and a fixed price can be charged. Similarly, as 
a solution shop deals with unstructured, hence 
unpredictable problems, charging a fee-for service 
is more appropriate Moreover, given their 
unstructured nature, processes cannot profit from 
capacity utilization made possible by routinization. 
Instead, they depend on the (expensive) human 
expertise with carrying out unstructured processes. 
Therefore, a key profit driver is the reputation of 
those involved in the process while a cost driver is 
their expense (cf. Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998). The 
mediating value proposition may also profit from 
scale and capacity utilization (as it can, for instance, 
use the same technical network to connect many 
clients) and it can and often does supply its services 
for a membership fee (see Christensen et al. 2009, 
p. 20 ff.). 
The last element of a business model, as 
described by Christensen et al. 2009, refers to the 
resources that are employed to carry out the 
processes and deliver the value proposition – 
including both human and other resources (tools, 
ICT, machinery, etc.). Again, a difference can be 
made according to the type of value proposition. In 
a value-adding process the focus is on technology 
enabling the swift sequential operation of activities 
(e.g. conveyer-belt technology, or systems 
optimizing the work-flow) and on low cost human 
resources. In a solution shop, human expertise is the 
most valuable asset (although tools and equipment 
are not unimportant either). In a mediating value 
proposition the focus is on the infrastructure 
enabling the network (e.g. ICT/internet and those 
facilitating the network).     
      In all, as Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) describe, 
three basic business models can be identified, each 
having their own characteristic business model 
components: 
 
(1) A value adding process business model 
(with as its value proposition: transforming 
inputs into outputs; with Porter’s value 
chain process-activities, with 
standardization and economies of scale of 
profit drivers, charging on a fixed price 
basis and with the focus on resources 
enabling standardization and low cost). 
(2) A solution shop business model (value 
proposition: solving unstructured 
problems; process activities related to 
iteratively dealing with unstructured 
problems (diagnosing them, designing and 
implementing solutions and evaluation); 
relying on expensive experts of good 
reputation and charging on a fee-for-
service basis). 
(3) A mediating business model (with its 
value proposition to link clients; process 
activities related to promote, operate and 
facilitate the network linking clients; with 
capacity-utilization of the network as its 
profit-driver and charging a membership 
fee). 
 
Business models as enablers of disruptive 
innovations 
 
After describing business models, it is relevant to 
discuss how they enable disruption. As Christensen 
argues, disruptive innovations always entail a 
change in a business model (i.e. a  change of one or 
more of their constituent components). They always 
entail the change of the value proposition. That is, 
based on some disruptive technology, a new value 
proposition is to bring to the market a product or 
service that can help customers to do more 
effectively, affordably, conveniently a job they 
have been trying to do than the products or services 
that are currently available. This is the case in low-
end disruptions, in which the new value proposition 
is to sell more affordable products with less 
functionalities to “over-served” customers. It is also 
the case in new-market disruptions, in which the 
new value proposition is to target new customers 
with a product that helps them to do a job that the 
old product wasn’t able to do. 
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Following a change in value proposition, 
processes and resources should be formulated and 
aligned to fit the new value proposition. If the new 
value proposition is to serve the low-end, price 
sensitive part of the market, the business model 
typically needs to allow a firm to “compete 
profitably while pricing at deep discounts” 
(Christensen et al., 2002, p. 26). This, in turn, 
requires a different profit formula, more efficient 
processes and/or resources than what incumbents 
have. A different alignment of business model 
components is also required if a value proposition 
targets at new customers with a product having 
other performance characteristics.  
In fact, one of the important “lessons” from 
disruptive innovation theory is that disruption 
always needs a change in business model. 
According to Christensen, a common theme 
concerning disruptive innovations is that 
incumbents are often aware of the disruptive 
technology but refuse to change their business 
model, because it is – to them - a sound way of 
making money. The new technology doesn’t serve 
their mainstream customers as good and profitably 
as the products they currently produce. So, why 
change their value proposition, processes and 
resources? Even if the new technology starts to lead 
to better products taking away customers at the low 
end of the market – incumbents tend to stick to their 
business model in the hope to make money by 
serving the more demanding customers (with 
sustaining innovations). As Christensen (2006) 
summarizes: “[…] a disruptive innovation is 
financially unattractive for the leading incumbent to 
pursue, relative to its profit model and relative to 
other investments that are competing for the 
organization’s resources” (p. 49). In other words, a 
business model may present a form of “disruptive 
blindness” on the part of incumbents. In fact, 
Christensen’s advice to incumbents, who want to 
react properly to a disruptive threat, is to start a new 
business unit with a different business model tied to 
products with the new disruptive technology.  
So, disruptive innovations require a change in 
business model. In this way, they enable disruption. 
Christensen et al. (2009) go on to discuss two 
different types of disruptive business model change: 
one in which the type of value propositions stays 
the same, and one in which the type of value 
proposition changes.  
A disruptive business model change that doesn’t 
lead to a new type of value proposition is one in 
which a firm either attracts the low end of the 
existing market or targets at non consumers with a 
similar type of value proposition but with a 
different profit formula, different resources or more 
efficient processes. Examples of such a business 
model change regarding low end disruptions 
include the steel mini-mills or Toyota (see earlier 
examples). Their basic value proposition remained 
the same (value adding process), but a new process-
technology (efficient mills) or a more efficient way 
of relating process activities (Toyota) made (low 
end) disruption possible. An example of a change in 
business model within the same type of value 
proposition attracting non-consumers might be 
Sony’s transistor radios appealing to a new type of 
customers: a new market disruption in a business 
with a “value adding process” value proposition. 
 A business model change can also result in a 
new business model with a value proposition of a 
different type – for instance HBO and Netflix are 
currently disrupting the home-video market. Until 
recently, this market was dominated by DVD-
producers (with sustaining innovations like blue-ray 
DVD). HBO and Netflix offer customers to watch 
movies and series whenever they want by offering 
them access to their network containing movies and 
series. In essence, their value proposition belongs to 
the facilitated network type while the DVD-
producers had a value-adding process business 
model. Amazon did something similar for the 
business of selling books, taking it from a value 
adding process to a facilitated network business, 
serving the low end of the market according to 
Christensen et al. (2009).  
Christensen et al., 2009, argue that a business 
model change which succeeds in moving from a 
solution shop business to a value adding process or 
a facilitated network business are especially 
powerful. Solution shop value propositions are – 
given their nature – business models leading to 
expensive products that can only be made by 
experts. If a technology becomes available which 
enables doing solution shop activities in a 
predictable, routine way, a business may be 
disrupted. This is so because making these products 
no longer relies on complex esoteric knowledge and 
experience of expensive experts, but based on the 
new technology, it becomes possible to standardize 
and routinize production, requiring less expertise. 
An example may be the diagnosis of infections 
(example adapted from Christensen et al., 2009). 
Once, this was the exclusive realm of medical 
specialists who might determine the type of 
infection based on trial and error and their vast 
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body of experience. As such it was a solution shop 
activity. Once diagnostic tests became available 
based on which a range of infections could be 
determined with certainty – the process of 
determining infections became much more 
affordable and accessible. Most of these tests can 
now be administered routinely by less expensive 
medical staff, taking less time to determine the 
result (although of course, specialists are still 
needed if standard tests yield no results). 
Christensen argues that Ford did something similar 
for the automobile industry: by standardizing the 
process of assembling cars he changed from a 
solution shop activity to a value adding process 
(resulting in much cheaper cars).  
Something similar holds for changing from a 
value adding process business to a facilitated 
network – which often allows for delivering 
services at lower production and overhead cost. 
So, disruptive innovations always need a change 
in business model, so as to support the potential of 
the disruptive technology. In the first place, a 
disruptive innovation always entails a change in 
value proposition (as simpler, more convenient 
and/or more affordable products are offered). This 
change can result in a different type of value 
proposition. Next, a disruptive innovation requires a 
reformulation and realignment of business model 
components (relative to the business model of 
incumbents) - so as to make sure that the disruptive 
product can be brought to the market as a low-end 
or new-market innovation. In fact, as Christensen et 
al., 2009 argue: to make disruptive innovations 
succeed, they require their own proper business 
model (which should be different from the business 
model of incumbents).   
In Christensen, Grossman and Hwang, 2009, the 
above logic of business models as enablers of 
disruption is further extended. The authors argue 
that organizations trying to mix different types of 
business models are at a disadvantage. In such a 
case, an organization may produce a product 
requiring solution shop activities and one which can 
be produced with value adding process activities. If 
they use the same resources and the same profit 
formula with respect to both types of products, then 
the value adding process product may become too 
expensive. In general, Christensen et al. (2009) 
argue that mixing types of business models in this 
way often leads to less affordable and accessible 
products. As a simple example, consider a group of 
psychologists offering two types of services: tailor-
made psychological counseling to deal with 
difficult psychological disorders and more routine 
services like administering IQ-tests. The first type 
of activity is a solution shop activity requiring 
expertise and iterative problem solving, while the 
latter is a routine value adding process activity 
requiring far less expertise. Now, if both types of 
activities are carried out by the same set of 
specialists charging a fee for service, the routine 
activity ends up being relatively expensive. A better 
idea is to make sure that the two types of activities 
have their own “business model” – e.g. their own 
set of resources, activities and profit formula. One 
line of business would be tied to routine activities 
(like IQ tests). The associated business model has a 
value adding process proposition, routine and 
standardized activities, relatively inexpensive 
personnel and it could charge a fixed price. The 
other line of business would house the solution 
shop activities carried out by the more expensive 
experts. IQ tests can become cheaper and experts 
can focus on delivering complex counseling. Both 
lines of business may improve. Although this is a 
simple example, Christensen et al. (2009) explains 
that “disentangling” business models, as he calls it, 
and making sure that value propositions of a 
different type are served by different business 
models is a powerful way of improving business 
models (one he uses to “disrupt healthcare 
institutions”, Christensen et al., 2009). By 
discussing disentangling business models, 
Christensen argues that if you mix business models, 
you may not reap the benefits of a potentially 
disruptive innovation. This is a specific 
reformulation of the adage that “disruptive 
innovations need their own proper business model” 
– as discussed above. However, given existing 
technology, disentangling business models may 
sometimes itself be a way to make products more 
affordable and accessible (as the example above 
shows – and Christensen et al., 2009 provide many 
more in the context of health care disruptions).  
 
2.2.3 A value network as enabler of disruptive 
innovations        
 
A disruptive innovation does not only require 
disruptive technology and a supportive business 
model – it also needs a “value network”. A value 
network is a “commercial infrastructure” […] 
through which […the disruptive product or 
service…] is delivered. (Christensen et al., 2009, p. 
xx and p. xxviii). It consists for instance of 
companies that help to market, produce, sell and 
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provide services for the new product; a network of 
e.g. producers, suppliers, service-companies, and 
vendors. Selling mainframes, for instance, relied on 
a different value network than selling PCs (which 
could, for instance, be sold by retailers). As 
Christensen et al. argue  disruption innovations 
need a fitting (and often different) value network. 
Producing and selling in high volume and low 
margin (low end disruption) requires a value 
network aimed at low cost. Similarly, attracting 
new customers (new market disruption) requires at 
least a value network with access to these new 
customers. A change in value proposition type (e.g. 
moving from a value adding process to a facilitated 
network business) also means a different value 
network (e.g. one helping to build and maintain the 
facilitated network instead of one sustaining 
production processes). 
 
To summarize, this section discussed both a 
description of disruptive innovations (as an 
innovation leading to more affordable, accessible 
and convenient products) and their three drivers 
(technological, business model and value network) 
– see  table 1. In section 3, we use these ideas to 
discuss disruptive intelligence. 
 
 
Table 1: description and drivers of disruptive innovations. 
 
3. Disruptive intelligence 
 
The goal of this paper is to understand the 
production of “disruptive intelligence” that is, 
information that may help to see whether a 
disruption is possible or whether a business is being 
disrupted. To structure the discussion of disruptive 
intelligence, it is helpful to see that the main 
question concerning disruptive innovations is:  
Is (will) a technological innovation (be) 
available that can be used, along with an 
appropriate business model and value network, to 
bring a product or service to the  market that may 
eventually grow into a product that is more 
affordable, accessible and/or convenient than the 
products that are currently available?  
 
We will call all information that may help to 
answer this question (before a business is actually 
disrupted) “disruptive intelligence”. This 
intelligence is relevant for incumbents as they may 
want to protect themselves against and make sure 
they react adequately to disruptions. It is also 
relevant for those considering participating in 
disrupting a business as they may want to know 
whether a potential disruptive innovation may stand 
a chance. 
Regarding the production of disruptive 
intelligence, three related questions are relevant. 
The first is: Are disruptions possible in this 
business? This question relates to whether a 
particular business is susceptible to disruption. 
Based on this information it becomes possible to 
anticipate a possible disruption and pro-actively 
deal with it. This information is also relevant for 
those planning a disruptive attack; the prospects of 
such an attack are of course better in a disruption-
prone business. The second question revolves 
around finding out whether a disruption may 
currently be happening. Have new entrants (or 
Disruptive innovation Drivers of disruptive innovations 
Description: 
An innovation 
eventually leading 
to more affordable, 
accessible and 
convenient 
products 
types: 
low-end (starting at 
low end of existing 
market); 
new market 
(attracting non-
consumers of old 
product) 
1. Technological innovation (making products or 
processes simpler) 
2. Business model ch 
        Components 
        - value proposition 
        - processes 
        -resources 
        -profit formula 
 
3. Value network (for making and selling the new 
products)  
 
Type of Business model 
 
 -solution shop 
 -value adding process 
- facilitated network 
 
. Business mod l c ange 
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incumbents) introduced a disruptive innovation? 
Obviously, the sooner incumbents have this 
information, the sooner they can react. Moreover, 
for those who are engaged in a disruptive attack, it 
is relevant to have an idea of the potential 
competition and whether their innovation is indeed 
a disruptive innovation. A last question relates to 
“disruptive myopia” – a bias in the capacity to 
produce disruptive intelligence. It seeks to make 
clear whether incumbents (and even the disruptive 
aggressor) may have (developed) systematic 
barriers preventing them from seriously answering 
the two above questions (and hence from 
discovering disruptive intelligence). Below, we will 
deal with each of these questions and in doing so 
we will present some intelligence-topics that could 
be pursued to answer the question. We want to 
note, however, that we don’t claim that these 
intelligence topics form a complete list – but we do 
argue that these topics will help to increase the 
possibility to deal with disruptions.  
 
3.1 Are disruptions possible in this business?  
 
Finding out whether a business is “disruption-
prone” it is relevant for two (related) reasons. The 
first is that you may want to know whether a 
business is susceptible to a disruption at all (this 
knowledge can raise ‘the level of disruption 
awareness’ – which may help incumbents to be 
alert and would-be entrants to discover 
opportunities). The second is that you may want to 
find out whether a particular innovative idea has a 
disruptive potential. 
 
3.1.1 Is any disruption possible in this business? 
 
Following Christensen and his colleagues, a 
business may be disrupted if its existing products or 
services are expensive, difficult to access and/or 
may not be convenient. Christensen et al. hold that 
“nearly every industry, at their outset […offered 
products and services…] that only people with a lot 
of money can afford them, and only people with a 
lot of expertise can provide or use them.” (2009, p 
xix). So, nearly every industry was or is disruption-
prone. Moreover, after a disruption occurs, a 
business may be disrupted even further… leading to 
more affordable, and accessible products. So, a first 
– very crude – indicator of “being disruptive-prone” 
is the degree to which a business has products or 
services that are not affordable and inaccessible. 
With respect to the degree of unaffordability we 
need to identify whether the products “can only be 
bought by people with a lot of money. ”Here, we 
need to be careful though, because (as a disrupted 
business may be disrupted again) “a lot of money” 
seems to be a relative measure. In disruptive 
innovation theory, the degree of accessibility relates 
to several ideas. It sometimes refers to the degree to 
which a product can be provided by people with a 
lot of expertise (like eye-surgery once was), 
sometimes to the degree to which a product can be 
used by people with a lot of expertise (like 
mainframe computers), and sometimes to the 
degree to which customers can get access to a 
product or service (e.g. if one has to buy it at some 
central location, or if acquiring it means waiting – 
like many healthcare services). Often, difficult-to-
provide and difficult-to-use products have these 
characteristics because they rely on ‘solution shop’ 
activities. An innovation transforming these 
activities into a value-adding process or facilitated 
network business may be disruptive (e.g. 
innovations have made certain eye-operations 
routine-activities decreasing their cost dramatically 
- cf. Christensen, 2009). A facilitated network may 
help to solve problems with acquiring products (e.g. 
access to films and series via HBO solves going to 
a retailer). So – a first indicator is the degree to 
which a business provides expensive and 
inaccessible products / service. 
A second indicator refers to the degree to which 
current products and services help clients to “do a 
job they have been trying to do” (cf. Christensen et 
al. 2003, Christensen et al. 2009). This is an 
extremely relevant point but also difficult to 
examine. If an existing product doesn’t help clients 
to do their job properly – the introduction of a 
product that does, may disrupt the business. This is, 
of course, a truism, but as it turns out many 
companies have a hard time pinning down the job 
of customers as they often frame their markets in 
terms of product- or client-characteristics (which 
are categories used by those selling the products), 
while the “job” “should be the fundamental unit of 
marketing analysis” (Christensen, et al. 2009, p. 11) 
as it represents that for which “customers hire a 
product or service”. So, markets shouldn’t (only) be 
analyzed using lists of product- and customer 
categories as they may miss the job customers hire 
a product for (this was already pointed out by early 
intelligence authors, like Geroski, 1988). 
Discovering the true “job” requires a different 
approach than existing marketing techniques. It 
requires a deep understanding of the life of 
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customers and the role existing products have 
therein, which calls for a more ethnographic 
approach in which customers’ socially embedded 
desires and actions are related to the use of 
products.   
A further indicator of a disruption-prone 
business is the degree to which customers are 
“over-served’ as Christensen et al. 2009 call it. As 
discussed, this refers to the difference between the 
functionalities offered by a particular product or 
service and the functionalities that costumers are 
able to utilize. The higher this ‘value’, the more 
susceptible the business is for a low-end disruption. 
This indicator may even be determined for different 
tiers of the market; and especially relevant 
information would be how many of the current 
customers would be willing to buy a product with 
less functionalities. Another related idea is to 
determine how many customers would still be 
interested in buying the product if it was stripped of 
its non-essential, excess functionalities (some 
research shows how markets can be approached in 
this way – e.g. Adner, 2002) 
Establishing whether a new market disruption 
might be possible is difficult as it needs to research 
the demands and behavior of non-consumers. For a 
part this overlaps with the indicators stated above 
for low-end disruptions (as current non-consumers 
may be non-consumers because they don’t have 
enough money to buy the product). However, if a 
product is to appeal to non-consumers for other 
product characteristics – one needs to find them. 
This, in turn, means gaining an understanding of the 
‘job’ of (non) customers in order to identify 
possible other contexts of use or competing 
products. An idea might be to identify groups of 
non-consumers and ask under which conditions 
they would use a similar product (again, other 
authors have put forward “methods” that can be 
used to identify relevant non-consumers – e.g. 
Geroski, 1988). If such products can be identified 
(and if these conditions include the use of products 
with less functionalities than the current ones) it 
may indicate that a business is disruption-prone. An 
example in this case would be the discovery that 
portable radios could be used by teenagers who 
were happy with them because it meant that they 
could listen to music whenever and wherever they 
wanted – which they valued more than quality of 
the transmission. 
A related indicator relating to a low-end and 
new-market disruption may be the degree of 
saturation of the “dominant product characteristic” 
– the characteristic most valued by mainstream 
customers (cf. Paap and Katz, 2004). The 
saturation-value is the value above which “more of 
the characteristic” doesn’t present extra value to a 
customer (in fact, this value may be one way of 
operationalizing the degree of “over-serving”). 
Paap and Katz (2004) give the example of storage-
capacity of disk-drives. At some point it exceeded 
the capacity that customers could use and valued. 
Hence, they argued, other characteristics may be 
introduced that can be of value (in the example: the 
portability of disk-drives). So, the moment 
saturation is reached, a business may become 
vulnerable to disruption. 
In all – to determine whether a business is 
“ready to be disrupted” one might consider the 
following indicators: 
 
1. The degree to which a business revolves 
around expensive products; 
2. The degree to which a business revolves 
around inaccessible products; 
3. The degree to which a business delivers 
products that do not completely fit the 
“job” customers are trying to do; 
4. The degree of “over-serving” of products 
in a business; 
5. The degree to which consumers would be 
willing to buy the product if it were 
stripped of its non-essential functionalities; 
6. The degree to which other contexts of use 
can be identified for simpler versions of 
the product; 
7. The degree of saturation of the dominant 
product-characteristic (relates to 4).         
   
3.1.2 Is this innovation potentially disruptive? 
 
The above indicators give a general impression of 
the possibility that a business can be disrupted, 
creating a certain “disruption-awareness”. The 
question we now turn to starts off with an idea for 
an innovation and aims at finding out whether this 
particular innovation might be a disruptive 
innovation.  
In part, this question has already been addressed 
by Christensen et al. (2002, 2003). In these texts, he 
gives so-called ‘litmus-tests’ for determining 
whether an innovation is potentially a low end 
disruption or a new market disruption. Here, we 
briefly summarize these tests, as they may be 
guiding the production of disruptive intelligence. 
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In a new market situation, Christensen et al. 
(2002) give three tests (1) the innovation must be a 
simple product appealing to non-consumers (p. 24-
25) (as the authors write, the Apple II was 
introduced as a toy for children; ibid p. 25); (2) the 
innovation should help customers to do a job they 
have been trying to do “more easily and 
conveniently” (p. 25). For instance, people have for 
a long time been trying to get rid of goods they no 
longer needed (e.g. through garage sales or 
occasional flee-markets), and applications offering 
online auctions (e.g. eBay) were a way of helping 
people to do get rid of their stuff more 
conveniently, reaching a far larger audience (cf. 
Christensen et al., 2009, p. 31). (3) the innovation 
should target customers who were unable to do a 
particular job because of “lack of money or 
expertise”. (c 2004, p. 24). The online auction-sites 
offered mentioned above offered the majority of 
people who could not afford the services of a real 
auction-company to participate in an auction. (cf. 
Christensen et al., 2003 and Christensen et al., 
2002, p. 24-25. for the three tests).  
According to Christensen et al. 2002, if an 
innovation is to bring about a low-end disruption it 
should pass the following two tests: (1) the degree 
of “over-serving” should be high enough and (2) it 
should be possible to make a low-cost business 
model (“[…] one that enables entrants to compete 
profitably while pricing at deep discounts” 
(Christensen et al. 2002, p. 26).  
So – given an innovative product of service 
(based on some technical driver) the above tests can 
direct intelligence efforts. But besides these tests, 
disruptive innovation theory presents more clues to 
determine whether some innovation may disrupt a 
business. These clues relate to the possible changes 
in the business model an innovation may bring 
about (Christensen et al. 2009). For instance, if a 
particular innovation enables the routinization or 
standardization of solution shop activities, then a 
business will most probably be disrupted. 
Something similar holds for an innovation that 
enables a change to a facilitated network business. 
A helpful question here is whether an innovation 
may help customers to help themselves (e.g. by 
some online or network service).  
Yet another clue relating to business model 
change is whether a disentanglement of a particular 
business model (of form of business model 
innovation, as Christensen et al. 2009 call it) may 
help to offer products or services more affordably. 
As we discussed earlier, making sure that different 
types of value propositions are served by different 
business models can often make products more 
affordable and accessible. So, disruptive 
intelligence can entail a form of “business model 
introspection” with the aim of trying to find out 
whether disentanglement is possible in your 
company.  
So, topics for disruptive intelligence regarding 
the question whether a particular innovation (either 
a new product or service or a business model 
innovation) is potentially disruptive are: 
 
1. “Is the innovation a simple product 
appealing to non-consumers?” 
2. “Does the innovation allow customers to do 
a job more easily and conveniently?” 
3. “Does the innovation target at customers 
who haven’t been able to do a job 
themselves because of lack of money or 
expertise?” 
 
These 3 topics are Christensen’s (Christensen et al., 
2002, p. 24-25) “litmus tests” for new market 
disruptions. 
 
4. Does the innovation target at a market in 
which the current products have a high 
degree of ‘over-serving?’ 
5. Can the supportive business model be 
changed in one that produces at low prices? 
 
These 2 topics are Christensen’s (Christensen et al., 
2002, p. 26) “litmus tests” for low-end disruptions. 
  
6. Does the innovation make a change in 
business model type possible (e.g. by 
routinization or by offering a mediating 
network)? 
7. Is it possible to disentangle the current 
business model? 
 
3.2 Is disruption going on?  
 
In this section we deal with information that may 
help to establish whether a business is currently 
being disrupted; i.e. whether some disruptive 
innovation has been launched. This is a difficult 
question: others may introduce some innovation 
sharing the characteristics of a disruptive 
innovation (e.g. it may underperform and only 
appeal to some of your customers) but it may well 
be that this product just doesn’t turn into a 
disruptive product. That disruptive innovations 
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have certain characteristics on the outset, doesn’t 
mean of course, that all innovations sharing these 
characteristics will be disruptive. The problem of 
predicting whether an innovation which is launched 
is potentially disruptive has been noticed by several 
authors (e.g. Christensen et al., 2003; Danneels, 
2006; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006a, b). Yet, 
based on disruptive innovation theory we feel that 
some clues may help to increase the possibility of 
establishing an answer to the question whether a 
business is being disrupted. 
First of all, it should be noted that all 
information gathered to answer the question from 
the previous section (is our business a disruptive-
prone business?) is helpful to answer the question 
in this section. If we know that we operate in a 
disruptive-prone business then we need to be extra 
alert and take threats of disruptive candidates 
seriously. Moreover, if we notice that an innovation 
has been launched sharing some of the 
characteristics of a disruptive innovation, we may 
want to acknowledge whether it passes 
Christensen’s “litmus tests”. If so (combined with 
knowing that the business is a disruptive-prone 
market) we should be very alert. 
On top of this information some other clues may 
be helpful. For instance, if an innovation seems 
promising one may expect a certain number of 
start-up firms (Christensen, et al. 2011). What may 
even be more telling is when an incumbent starts a 
different business model tailored to this innovation. 
As Christensen et al. argue an incumbent cannot 
incorporate a disruptive innovation in its current 
business model; it needs to launch it from a 
different business model (like IBM who started a 
separate business unit to produce PCs – cf. 
Christensen et al. 2009). So, information on 
incumbents starting up a new business unit with a 
new business model is relevant disruptive 
intelligence’. 
An interesting technique for predicting the 
disruptiveness of an innovation that has been 
introduced is using s-curves which describe the 
sales-pattern of most disruptive innovations (e.g. 
Paap and Katz, 2004; Christensen and Eyring, 
2011). Sales of disruptive innovations usually 
follow an s-curve pattern, with few, but steadily 
growing number of sales at the beginning, followed 
by a abrupt growth in sales, again stabilizing 
eventually. If sales of a new product have reached 
the steep part of the s-curve, it may be too late. So, 
the trick is to predict whether some sales-growth (at 
the start of the s-curve) will turn into a sudden 
growth in sales (in the middle of the s-curve). One 
method that may shed light on this issue is to 
rescale sales on a logarithmic scale. As Christensen 
(2011, 96) shows, the s-curve then turns into a line-
graph based on which it may be easier to see 
whether the initial sales fit in an s-curve, and hence 
are predictive of a sudden growth. 
Another relevant indicator has to do with losing 
tiers in a market. Finding out that incumbents have 
lost the least-demanding low-end tiers of the market 
and concentrate on the more profitable tiers is a 
relevant indicator of a disruption. In fact, the more 
tiers that are lost, the more one can be sure that the 
innovation is disrupting a business. Unfortunately, 
this information may be a very late warning signal.                     
Yet another indicator has to do with a change in 
value-network. As the disruptive innovation targets 
at different customers or may entail a change in 
business model, one may expect a change in firms 
that are part of the value network. Once, for 
instance, retailers are willing to give the new 
product a chance, this may signal such a change. 
One may also expect a growth of start-up firms in 
the value network.    
A last indicator we want to mention here is a 
change in business model of (new) competitors. It 
may be a sign of disruption if new entrants have a 
different type of business model, or if competitors 
disentangle their business model. 
So, in order to determine whether a business is 
being disrupted, the following indicators (besides 
the ones mentioned in the previous section) may be 
relevant: 
 
(1) The number of start-up firms  
(2) Are incumbents starting up a new business 
unit with respect to the new innovation? 
(3) Are sales of the innovation following the 
usual pattern of disruptive innovations? 
(4) Are incumbents losing (low-end) tiers of 
the market? 
(5) Is the value network changing? 
(6) Do new entrants have different (types of) 
business models? 
(7) Are competitors disentangling their 
business models?  
  
3.3 Do we suffer from disruptive blindness? 
The last intelligence related topic we want to 
discuss in this paper is whether a company may 
have developed systemic biases preventing it to 
produce disruptive intelligence and act on it. 
Following disruptive intelligence theory, 
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incumbents are often not motivated to react to 
disruptive attacks as they aim for the least attractive 
tiers of the market. In the face of such attacks, 
incumbents are motivated to focus on the more 
attractive, profitable tiers of the market. Moreover, 
as Christensen and Raynor, 2003, argue, 
incumbents favor sustaining innovations as they 
target at the profitable tiers of the market, and 
hence, increase (short-term) share-holder 
appreciation. Investments in (uncertain) innovations 
that target at less profitable tiers simply do not 
appeal to shareholders. So, the current way of doing 
business may prevent incumbents to engage in 
disruptive innovations and often realize that they 
should have reacted when it’s too late. Phrased 
differently, because their way of doing business is 
deeply rooted in one particular business model, they 
fail to see the threat of disruption. This is a 
common theme in disruptive innovation theory and 
if incumbents want to protect themselves against 
disruption, it is relevant to investigate to what 
extent they suffer from such ‘disruptive blindness’. 
In this section, we suggest some indicators of this 
blindness, which can be used to create a certain 
awareness of existing biases. 
Before we discuss some indicators of 
“disruptive blindness” we would like to point out 
that some of the “business blind spots” that were 
put forward by Gilad (1996) in the context of 
competitive intelligence, can be reframed in terms 
of the reaction-pattern of incumbents to disruptive 
innovations. Gilad (1996) discusses, for instance, 
“false or biased assumptions” as a blind spot which 
may impair strategic decision making. An example 
he gives is the biased assumption of many large 
firms that they do not have to pay attention to 
smaller players on the market. But often, as he 
describes, large players pay dearly for this blind 
spot when a small player launches a successful 
product. Based on disruptive innovation theory, it 
becomes possible to better understand this blind 
spot. In fact, disruptive innovation theory shows 
that this assumption may in fact be a valid 
assumption with respect to sustaining innovations. 
It also shows that new entrants (often small players) 
most of the time win the battle for disruptive 
innovations, because incumbents are stuck to their 
business model (in which the newly introduced, 
inferior product, not appealing to their mainstream 
customers doesn’t make much sense). So, based on 
disruptive innovation theory it can be understood 
that “not paying attention to small players” may not 
be a bias per se, but that it fits a response pattern of 
incumbents to disruptive innovations. 
A first indicator of “disruptive myopia” might 
the answer to the following question: “Do we 
actively try to answer the above two questions (3.1 
and 3.2) related to disruptive intelligence?” 
Obviously, if no effort is put in answering these 
questions, one probably has no clue about whether 
one operates in a disruptive-prone market, whether 
particular innovations have a disruptive potential, 
or whether a disruption may be going on. In fact, in 
order to produce disruptive intelligence, one needs 
to make an effort, which should translate itself in an 
infrastructure related to producing intelligence. It 
should, for instance, be someone’s responsibility; 
and time and resources should be made available. 
Not having an infrastructure tailored to producing 
disruptive intelligence is an indicator of disruptive 
blindness.  
Another indicator of disruptive blindness relates 
to the “forces that shape the process of innovation” 
as Christensen and Raynor 2003 (p. 9 ff.) describe. 
As these authors argue, innovative ideas are “sifted 
and shaped” by middle managers in many 
organizations, who “typically hesitate to throw their 
weight behind new product concepts whose market 
is not assured” (Christensen and Raynor, 2003, p. 
11). They need to be as sure as possible about a 
product’s potential (as both budget decisions and 
their career depend on it) and often rely on the 
feedback of “significant customers”. But as a 
disruptive innovation often does not appeal to these 
customers, disruptive ideas tend to be deselected. 
Sustaining innovations, however, do appeal to this 
set of customers, thus having a tendency of being 
preferred. So – the process of innovation of 
incumbents has a bias towards sustaining 
innovations (and against disruptive ones). To deal 
with this blindness (i.e. to at least become aware of 
it) it may be an idea to keep track of the innovative 
proposals and the reasons for their selection or 
rejection. This list may indicate the degree to which 
sustaining innovations are preferred over 
potentially disruptive ones. And, against the 
background of knowledge about the degree of 
disruptive-proneness of a business (e.g. 
operationalized by the degree of over-serving 
customers) one may decide whether the actual 
proportion of sustaining/potentially disruptive ideas 
is dangerous or not. Another idea might be to make 
sure that reasons for selection/rejection do not only 
refer to the feedback of significant customers, but 
also to a kind of ‘disruptive reasoning’. Ideally such 
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reasoning includes an (“job-to-be-done”-related) 
analysis of the appeal of the idea to the low-end of 
the market or to non-consumers and an analysis of 
the potential of the product in appealing to 
mainstream customers. 
A third indicator relates to the reaction if one is 
confronted with losing a part of the (low end of) the 
market. Often, as Christensen and Raynor, 2003, 
describe, incumbents are quite happy to focus on 
the more profitable tiers of the market. However, 
precisely this attitude is an important indicator of 
disruptive blindness.  
A fourth bias that incumbents often display may 
be called the “business cycle fallacy” which 
roughly goes like this: If business is booming, we 
don’t need to invest in innovations whose prospect 
is unclear and if business is in a slump we can’t 
afford to invest in innovations whose prospect is 
unclear”. This, again, is a “disruptive innovation 
de-selection”-mechanism. As Christensen et al. 
2002 argue it should be the other way around: if 
things are looking good – see if a separate business 
unit around a potential disruptive innovation can be 
set up; if things look bleak, you may well be too 
late. 
A last indicator, related to disruptive blindness 
we want to mention in this section has to do with 
knowledge about disruptive innovations. The 
degree to which all involved in the process of 
innovation has knowledge about disruptive 
innovations and their drivers is an important 
indicator of blindness. Without such knowledge, 
one cannot help to fall into the traps of biases 
deselecting disruptive innovations (cf. Christensen 
et al., 2002, p. 30). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, the idea of ‘disruptive intelligence’ is 
presented. Basedon disruptive innovation theory, 
we discussed the nature of disruptive innovations 
and their drivers. It is apparent that if one wants to 
deal with the threat (or opportunity) of a business 
disruptions one needs to produce “disruptive 
intelligence”. That is, one needs to produce 
information about (1) whether a particular business 
is “disruptive-prone” and (2) whether a disruption 
may be happening. In this paper, which is purely 
analytical and descriptive, we have provided several 
indicators that can be helpful in answering these 
two questions. In fact – these indicators can be 
taken to be helpful indicators in producing 
disruptive intelligence. Moreover, we discussed 
some indicators that may reveal if companies are 
suffering from “disruptive blindness” – i.e. 
indicators showing that companies may have 
difficulties producing disruptive intelligence. 
Even though we think that our paper contributes 
to a more systematic description of the information 
needed to deal with disruptive innovations, we are 
not there yet. In particular, the list of indicators can 
be extended – based on further conceptual and 
practical explorations. Empirical studies should also 
follow.         
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